|
David C. Hinze and Karen Farnham, "The Battle of Carthage:
Border War in Southwest Missouri, July 5, 1861" . Campbell,
CA: Savas Publishing Co., 1997. vi + 314 pp. Notes, maps,
bibliography, author interview. $24.95 (hardcover), ISBN 1-882810-06-6.
Reviewed for H-CivWar by Wolfgang Hochbruck, whochbruck@gtg1848.de,
English Department, University of Freiburg/Germany.
Ask anybody about the first battle of the Civil War. Almost
invariably, the answer will be "Bull Run" ("First Manassas,"
if you want). However, there was a smaller-scale battle
more than two weeks earlier, and its impact, though hardly
noticeable in Washington or Richmond, was certainly felt
in the Trans- Mississippi theater of the war. David C. Hinze,
teacher of history at a high school in Rolla, Missouri,
and his former student Karen Farnham, have spent much time
and effort to give a detailed account of one of the least
researched battles of the Civil War.
The fight at Carthage had all the odds for fame stacked
against it: it took place in southwestern Missouri, far
from the capitals and centers, with no reporters or big
newspapers at hand. It was fought between pro-Confederate
Missouri State Guardsmen on the one side and predominantly
German Union volunteers on the other, and few of the men
present rose to larger fame. And it was a draw.
Actually, as far as the last point is concerned, Hinze
and Farnham argue that it wasn't: "While results can be
manipulated and debated, one thing remains clear: Carthage
was the first true field victory for Southerners and one
of the few successes in Missouri during four bloody years
of military strife" (p. 217). In the face of all the arguments
Hinze and Farnham present, one might still argue that 'Forty-eighter'
Colonel Franz Sigel and his badly outnumbered command inflicted
higher casualties than they suffered themselves and, after
a day of hard fighting, managed an orderly withdrawal --
a very difficult maneuver with largely untrained volunteer
troops, and certainly something Gen. Irwin McDowell, for
example, did not effect at Bull Run sixteen days later.
While the authors' final conclusion thus remains debatable,
the whole book is no doubt the most comprehensive piece
of research written on the Battle of Carthage to date. As
far as the battle itself is concerned, it is difficult to
imagine a more detailed and thorough investigation. In light
of the scattered, problematic, missing, and often contradictory
evidence available, to research an early trans-Mississippi-theater
battle like this one is no minor undertaking, and Hinze
and Farnham make a remarkable job of it. As usual, local
folklore, belittling or self-aggrandizing reports by the
respective commanding officers, and sometimes outright falsifications
have to be taken into account. To make things worse, most
of the reminiscences of the battle were written decades
after the war, creating at best uncertain images, at worst
complete distortions of what happened. Hinze and Farnham
seem to steer a relatively safe course between the conflicting
memoirs, carefully weighing them against each other.
One of their most interesting conclusions is that the
running battle reportedly fought between Sigel's men and
the Missouri State Guard between Buck Branch and Spring
River, where Sigel's batteries supposedly leap-frogged along
the retreating, moving open square formed by infantry and
wagons, simply did not take place. Even if Sigel's forces
moved in the described manner, there is no evidence that
anybody tried to get too close. "It was not simply or even
primarily Sigel's superb training or discipline that won
the race . . . but the chronically inept handling of the
Southern cavalry and the exhausted and disrupted state of
the slowly pursuing Missouri State Guard infantry" (p. 175).
This is one of the points the authors repeatedly make (have
to make): whereas there was no lack of general officers
among the State Guard, in decisive moments there was a lamentable
lack of generalship. There is, for example, no evidence
that Governor Claiborne F. Jackson led the troops nominally
under his command -- or who else did. Worse, the pincer
movement around Sigel's flanks and into his back was not
only ineffective -- Lt. Col. Hassendeubel's battalion brushed
off the guardsmen blocking their way at Buck Branch (p.
169-70) -- but it further fragmented what little cohesion
there had been on the Rebel side originally. However, in
an army in which "rampant nepotism . . . permeated its ranks"
and "family ties took precedence over military training
or competency [sic]" (p. 69), such things are probably unavoidable.
Considering the odds, the rank and file of the Missouri
State Guard seem to have marched and fought with astounding
alacrity and perseverance.
The book is, on the whole, particularly strong on the
Missouri State Guard and on the proto-Confederate political
and military forces in Missouri and environs. The roles
men like James Spencer Rains and Mosby Monroe Parsons played,
as well as the characters of the men themselves, are aptly
presented. Unfortunately, the same does not always apply
to the Union side of the conflict, even though there are
some strong moments here, too. One valuable insight is that
into the obstructive role of "Chief Quartermaster Justus
McKinstry, a quintessential bureaucrat," who seems never
to have realized what a revolutionary situation he was in.
Whereas they attempt to do justice to the background of
the German "Forty-Eighters" among the Unionists in Missouri,
Hinze and Farnham do not go as far as Steven Rowan, who
has conclusively shown that what happened in St. Louis in
the Spring of 1861 was in effect the "Second Baden revolution"
-- a violent overthrow of a counter-revolutionary State
government on behalf of a grander national democratic idea.
Only this time, the veterans of 1848 and 1849 were more
successful. Unfortunately, this aspect is left out (as is
Steven Rowan's name in the bibliographic citation of the
important book "Germans for a Free Missouri").
Of the chapter entitled "The Germans" (pp. 10-36), only
four pages are really devoted to the German population in
St. Louis and the Union volunteers of 1861. What the authors
have to say about Franz Sigel's background on pp. 91-92
is simply a garbled mess -- and Hinze/Farnham cannot blame
their sources here: Stephen Engle's "Yankee Dutchman: The
Life of Franz Sigel" is usually accurate as far as the research
is concerned. Most of the avoidable as well as the unavoidable
inaccuracies in "The Battle of Carthage" sneak into the
text where the German soldiers are concerned. Unavoidable
are mistakes the authors inherit from older books like Ella
Lonn's "Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy" (1951) or
A. E. Zucker's "The Forty-eighters: Political Refugees of
the German Revolution" (1950), both of which have 48er veteran
Captain Adolf Dengler killed at Vicksburg. His Co. G was
one of the units that confronted the Missouri State Guard
attempt to cross Dry Fork Creek, he was cited by Sigel in
his official report, and he lived to command the 43rd Illinois
to the end of the war.
Other mistakes are clearly due to deficient editorship.
Soldiers described as in rags on page 64 turn into well-dressed
men again by page 122, wearing "gray jackets (some trimmed
with yellow piping), gray jeans pants and black shoes."
The sources for this description are not given. Actually,
the 3rd Missouri regiment wore a grey blouse with red collar
(or neckerchief), probably modeled after the garments worn
by the revolutionists in Germany in 1848 and 1849, notably
by Georg Herwegh's "Legion" of German exiles returning to
fight for democracy. Sigel's men were making a political
statement by the cut of their uniforms. As far as the rest
of the uniform is concerned, Andy Thomas's paintings, one
of which is used for the book cover, are better researched
than Hinze/Farnham's text. Likewise, a number of technical
inaccuracies mar the text. Only the rifle companies of Sigel's
infanty did indeed have rifles. The rest of the soldiers
were equipped with smoothbores, Springfield 1842 model,
and possibly even 1816 conversions, so the repeated assertion
that the Federal fire was superior to that of the Missouri
State Guard because they had rifles (pp. 122, 151) is not
grounded on fact. Likewise, the authors forget somewhere
along the road that Franz Backhoff's cannons, like those
of the Missouri State Guard, were old 6-pounders -- why
Hiram Bledsoe, with one odd Mexican 9-pounder among his
assorted hardware (p. 81), is all of a sudden commanding
"lighter pieces" (p. 158) remains a mystery. The spirit
of adventure seems to have gotten the better of the diligent
research, especially regarding the latter stages of the
battle, where numbers and company designations of the participating
Germans vary, and maintained order while marching by company
through the streets of Carthage (p. 183-84) turns into "Federals
. . . scrambling about in an [sic] mad attempt to escape"
(p. 189). And while "The Battle of Carthage" does contain
comparatively less of the jingoistic "Germish" encountered
in other campaign histories, already the idea that German
volunteers would have "serenaded . . . young ladies with
'John Brown's Body' and 'The Star-Spangled Banner' . . .
delivered in a mixture of broken English and German" (p.
103) is simply ridiculous. These problems, plus the usual
misspellings of German names and institutions, could and
should have been avoided. But then the focus of the authors'
attention is clearly on the southern side of the conflict,
and as stated above, it is difficult to imagine a more thoroughly
investigated account of the battle of Carthage itself. If
the book is, as David Hinze states in an (otherwise superfluous)
interview at the end, "a labor of love under construction"
(p. 314), then in a second edition they should eliminate
these and other mistakes, and revise the incomplete bibliography.
Copyright 1998 by H-Net, all rights reserved. This work
may be copied for non-profit educational use if proper credit
is given to the author and the list. For other permission,
please contact H-Net@H-Net.MSU.EDU
|